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Who are the Orang Riau? Negotiating Identity across Geographic 
and Ethnic Divides 
Michele Ford 
Debates about identity have multiplied across Indonesia in the wake of the implementation of 
regional autonomy. In the ethnically heterogeneous province of Riau, identity is prominent in 
the public debate and pivotal to struggles over the distribution of resources and questions of 
political allegiance. This chapter examines the extent to which these public discourses of 
identity are reflected at the grassroots level, drawing from my own experiences as an 
intermittent member of a non-Malay Riau household, and on data from semi-structured 
interviews conducted in June 2002 with community leaders and 40 other people from a range 
of social and ethnic backgrounds (see Table 9.1). 
Half of the interviews took place in Pekanbaru (the provincial capital, located on the 
mainland) and half in Tanjungpinang (traditionally the major administrative centre in the 
islands). They focused on four issues: understandings of regional autonomy; the potential 
division of Riau into two provinces; who can lay claim to being an orang Riau (a person of 
Riau); and relationships among ethnic groups. 
My informants’ responses confirmed that the hopes of the people of Riau for improved access 
to economic resources have fuelled both general public support for autonomy and Malay 
claims to preferential treatment. However, they also suggested that affective factors should 
not be overlooked in attempts to understand the nuances of regional autonomy in Riau. On 
the one hand, Malay identity is emerging as a form of collective expression. On the other, 
Malay claims to place have left many non-Malays with a sense that they have no place to 
claim. Where, then, does indigeneity end and citizenship begin? This question, which lies at 
the very heart of the identity conundrum in Riau, is important for Indonesia as a whole as it 
emerges from the New Order period. 
Claims to place in an ethnically diverse province 
Resource-rich Riau incorporates not only part of the Sumatran mainland but also thousands 
of islands scattered over hundreds of thousands of square kilometres of ocean. It has long had 
one of the most ethnically heterogeneous populations in Indonesia (Table 9.2). As a 
consequence, the debate about citizenship in Riau is very different from that in provinces in 
which claims to place are accompanied by clear, ethnically based definitions of who is – and 
who is not – entitled to make them. The semantics here are instructive. Unlike the orang 
Jawa, for whom place and ethnicity are identical, or the orang Sumatra Barat, for whom 
place is a clear synonym for ethnicity, the question of who can call themselves orang Riau is 
strongly contested. For many, belonging – rather than ethnicity – lies at the heart of identity. 
 
The Malays, who originally came from the islands – along with the Suku Laut (maritime 
people) and the mainland’s indigenous non-Malay tribes, including the Talang Mamak, Akit, 
Hutan, Sakai and Bonai peoples (Djatmiko 1993: 35) – are widely considered to be 
indigenous to the province.1 Malays and indigenous non-Malay tribespeople are not the only 
ones to make claims to place in Riau, however. As its mainland borders were drawn in a 
seemingly arbitrary manner, the province incorporates the homelands of significant numbers 
of Minangkabau (the dominant ethnic group in West Sumatra) and Batak (the ethnic group 
mostly associated with North Sumatra). In addition, Riau has long been the destination of 
migrants from other parts of the archipelago and from abroad, and the rate of intermarriage 
has been high. 
In recent decades, Batam’s population alone has risen from 6,000 in 1973 (BIDA 1998: 8) to 
over 400,000, and the province’s population as a whole has more than doubled since 1980. 
On the mainland, as a result of transmigration, the Javanese are the dominant group of 
migrants in traditionally Malay rural areas (Tirtosudarmo 1990), while Bataks are strongly 
represented on plantation holdings. Pekanbaru and Dumai are essentially Minangkabau, or 
Minang, towns. In the islands, where the Bugis were a historically influential migrant 
community, the dominant contemporary migrant groups are the Javanese, Minang and Batak 
– although migrants from Flores are more visible than the statistics suggest. Mainland and 
insular Riau are also home to large numbers of Chinese, who mostly live in the islands and 
the coastal cities of the mainland (GOI 1999: 14). 
 
  
 Separatism and sovereignty 
Riau’s wealth, demography and geography are important in defining the tensions between the 
province’s separatist movement and its opponents (see Bach, forthcoming), and between the 
mainlanders and the islanders over the ongoing push for a separate province for the islands. 
Free Riau (Riau Merdeka), the Malay separatist movement, emerged soon after the fall of 
Soeharto on the university campuses of Pekanbaru, under the leadership of Tabrani Rab. It 
came to national attention when the group proclaimed Riau a sovereign state on 15 March 
1999. Given the province’s rich resources, the separatists preferred to conceive of Riau 
becoming an autonomous political entity in a pan-Malayan world stretching across the straits 
of Malacca to the north, rather than south towards Java. Before the timber boom of the 1980s, 
Riau had been the wealthiest of the Indonesian provinces, contributing some 60 per cent of 
national oil production as well as being an important source of bauxite and tin (Butar-Butar 
2000). In recent decades the focus has shifted from mining to manufacturing and tourism in 
the islands, particularly on Batam, where the central government encouraged foreign 
investment in manufacturing. Meanwhile, mainland Riau became Indonesia’s largest 
producer of pulp and paper and a major player in the palm oil industry, while remaining 
Indonesia’s premier source of oil (Soetrisno and Dewanta 1993; Butar-Butar 2000) (Table 
9.3). 
Riau now has the third highest per capita GDP in Indonesia after East Kalimantan and 
Jakarta, and the third highest gross regional GDP outside of Java (BPS 2002b, 2002c). In 
2000, it is estimated to have accounted for 23 per cent (US$11,012 million) of Indonesia’s 
total export income and 28 per cent of the country’s oil revenue (BPS Riau 2002a, 2002b). 
Yet while Riau has earned billions of rupiah for the central government and for the provincial 
elite, its people have received little benefit from their province’s wealth (Rice 1989: 134; 
Rusli, Sumardjo and Syaukat 1996). Economic development has been strongly centred 
around Pekanbaru, with the focus on extractive and primary industries favouring investors 
from other parts of Indonesia or abroad. Yet, according to some estimates, over 40 per cent of 
the population live below the poverty line and only 16 per cent have a high school education 
(Djasit 2001). In the words of one local inhabitant, for the average person, living in Riau is 
akin to suffering from starvation while sitting on top of a milch cow (interview with Tabrani 
Rab, Pekanbaru, June 2002). 
Just as the physical and symbolic distance between Jakarta and Riau defines the relationship 
between core and periphery, so too does the distance between the mainland and the islands. 
For the proponents of a separate province in the islands (which would be called Kepulauan 
Riau, or Kepri), the lure of independence is outweighed by the spectre of continuing 
dominance by the mainland. Instead, they contend that insular Riau can best achieve 
sovereignty in the post-Soeharto era by standing alone, free of the authority of Pekanbaru, as 
an independent province within Indonesia. 
Although the idea of Riau as a region with its own identity has a long history in the islands 
(Wee 1985: 66; Wee and Chou 1997: 528), the formal existence of Riau as a separate 
province is relatively new. At the time of Indonesian independence, most of the mainland – 
including Pekanbaru and many of the islands close to the Sumatran coast – was part of the 
residency of East Sumatra, while its western and southern extremities were subsumed by 
West Sumatra and Jambi respectively. It was only in 1958 that Riau acquired its present 
form. When the seat of provincial power was shifted from Tanjungpinang to Pekanbaru soon 
after, the islands were forced into a new relationship with the mainland. With the exception 
of Batam, the islands received little attention from New Order development planners, and the 
people of insular Riau were forced to rely on Pekanbaru – or, in the case of Batam, on Jakarta 
– for the provision of government services and community facilities. 
Vivienne Wee has argued that Riau Malays have sought to answer the question of ‘who owns 
Riau’ through a process of atavism, or politically motivated ethno-historical claims (Wee 
2002: 17). Her insight is a powerful one that has currency beyond the island Malays among 
whom she carried out her research. Elite Malay discourse on mainland Riau is also imbued 
with a strong sense of history of former Malay greatness (Al Azhar 1997: 767). Political 
separatists and cultural assimilationists alike draw on the past when defining the present, 
albeit with very different results. In seeking sovereignty, the separatists aim to reconstruct the 
glory of earlier times when Riau was at the centre of the Malay world rather than on the 
periphery of a Java-centric Indonesia. They promote an exclusive form of Malay sovereignty 
that leaves little space for other groups long established in Riau: 
In demographic terms, the people who live in Riau now come from many tribes, 
but politically, it is important to return to the past, to history – Malays deserve 
political priority because we own this place. We must be masters of our own 
house. Newcomers need to adjust to our visions, to our dreams – they must 
remember that someone owns this land. We don’t want to go forward from our 
position at the end of the Soeharto era – we want to go forward from where we 
were at the end of the nineteenth century (interview, Riau Merdeka supporter, 
Pekanbaru, June 2002). 
In contrast, Tenas Effendy of the Malay Cultural Institute (LAM) emphasises that Malayness 
itself was created by a process of acculturation (akulturasi) among a heterogeneous 
population over centuries. Problems have arisen, he argues, because of increasing materialism 
and the corresponding loss of traditional values. Whereas people once came to Riau with the 
philosophy, dimana bumi dipijak, disitu langit dijunjung (‘where our feet touch the earth is 
where we hold up the sky’), in recent decades that philosophy has become dimana bumi 
dipijak, disitu tanah dikapling (‘where our feet touch the earth is where we subdivide the 
land’). In response, he says, Malays have drawn new boundaries, excluding groups who 
‘previously felt themselves to be orang Riau’ (interview with Tenas Effendy, LAM, 
Pekanbaru, June 2002). Malay resentment about the unequal distribution of economic and 
political power has taken a very concrete form in recent years. Malay militia groups have 
made threats against Caltex and a number of other large companies operating in Riau over 
issues of inadequate compensation. Ethnic tensions have also risen. Outbreaks of physical 
conflict have occurred between ethnic groups both on the mainland and in the islands – most, 
although not all, involving Malays. 
Riau Merdeka lost much of its momentum when Al Azhar replaced Tabrani, who traded in 
his local credibility for a place on the central government’s Regional Autonomy Council. 
Popular support for the organisation softened further as Riau gained access to a larger 
proportion of its provincial income and Malays were preferentially appointed to political 
positions and some civil service posts. Although many representatives of Minang, Batak and 
Malay ethnic organisations continue a strong discourse of interethnic tolerance (interviews, 
June 2002), the issues raised by Riau Merdeka are echoing long and loud. Most important 
among them is the question of who can lay claim to citizenship in Riau, and consequently to 
the economic and political benefits promised by regional autonomy. 
Community responses to regional autonomy and Riau’s geographic divides 
How entrenched are the divisions between geographical regions and ethnic groups among 
grassroots communities in Riau? To what extent does public rhetoric predict the future of the 
province? Regional autonomy was widely supported by interview respondents in both 
Pekanbaru and Tanjungpinang (Figure 9.1). In fact, only two respondents who understood 
what autonomy meant were opposed to it – a serving army officer and a retired navy officer, 
both of whom were Java-born Javanese.  
The most common reason given for supporting regional autonomy was the expectation that it 
would redress the imbalance between Riau’s resources and the welfare of its people. 
Conversely, a perceived decline in economic welfare underpinned some respondents’ desire 
for a return to the stability of the New Order period. A number of informants – particularly 
those involved in government, or in businesses that dealt with government – believed that 
there was already evidence of improvements in Riau’s economy. Examples cited included 
new buildings in Pekanbaru, an increase in salaries for civil servants and improved 
opportunities for public scrutiny of development projects. Many more who could not point to 
actual improvements to date were nevertheless optimistic that these would be realised sooner 
rather than later. Both mainland and island respondents were generally supportive of the 
central government’s decision to concentrate economic and political decision-making power 
at the kabupaten/kota (district/municipality) level, because local decision-makers were 
perceived as being more in touch with the needs of their constituents, and more accountable 
to them. 
 
In contrast, there was a clear division on the question of establishing a separate province for 
the islands. Most mainland respondents were either against or indifferent to the idea of 
splitting Riau. The mainlanders who opposed the formation of Kepri generally did so because 
they believed Riau’s influence would wane and that the mainland would suffer economically 
if the division were to proceed; a small number felt that the new province would be overly 
vulnerable to Singaporean interests. In contrast, in the islands it was felt almost unanimously 
that having a separate province would be beneficial. Reasons given for supporting the push 
for a separate province ranged from practical considerations, such as minimising bureaucracy 
and improving community services, to questions of cultural disparity. 
Most informants in Tanjungpinang believed that the islands had been neglected by the 
provincial government because of their distance from Pekanbaru and because of a lack of 
understanding about conditions in the islands. Three Malay respondents pointed to the 
difficulties associated with having to travel to Pekanbaru to organise documents and permits, 
and a fourth argued that the mainlanders did not understand the needs of those in the islands. 
The fifth Malay, a mainland-born teacher who had been posted to Tanjungpinang, was one of 
only two islanders who did not support the formation of a separate province in the islands. 
Non-Malay informants born in the islands all had strong feelings about the need for a 
separate province. Two pointed to the practical considerations of transport and bureaucracy. 
A third emphasised the different ways mainlanders and islanders interact socially, and a 
fourth the differences in language and culture. According to the fifth, the islanders wanted to 
demonstrate their own identity, which was more closely aligned to Malaysia than to mainland 
Riau. 
According to one man, the differences between the islands and the mainland were a product 
of history and the islanders’ ties to neighbouring countries: 
Even though they are all Malay and they’re all related, they are separated by the 
sea, so their historical journeys have been different. Because Kepri is so close to 
Malaysia and Singapore, they have a close relationship [with Singaporeans and 
Malaysians] and many have intermarried. On the mainland, they have been more 
influenced by Minang culture (interview, long-term resident, Tanjungpinang). 
Other long-term and short-term residents gave similar reasons for supporting an independent 
province for the islands. 
Questions of belonging and contested claims to place 
On one level, debate over the right to call oneself orang Riau is defined by a struggle for 
economic resources. On another, however, it represents a struggle for belonging. While 
respondents were quick to point to economic issues as the root of ethnic tension, the sense of 
betrayal and hurt felt by many mainland non-Malays in the face of perceived Malay 
chauvinism was also clear. Despite this, most respondents in Pekanbaru and Tanjungpinang 
believed that people born in Riau, as well as Malays, could make claims to place (Figure 9.2). 
Understandably, short-term residents were least often included in the definitions of orang 
Riau. It is of note, however, that one-quarter of respondents believed that even those who had 
been in the province for just a few years had the right to call themselves orang Riau if they 
could demonstrate their commitment to the province and felt that they belonged there. In the 
words of one newcomer, reflecting on the perspective of non-Malays in general, ‘no matter 
where they’re born, if they feel that they belong here, they call themselves orang Riau’. 
On the whole the islanders provided more inclusive definitions of orang Riau, and felt that 
interethnic relations were more stable in the islands (with the notable exception of Batam) 
than on the mainland. In contrast, in Pekanbaru there was a general feeling that ethnic 
divisions have grown in recent years, a development that was seen to be closely associated 
with the push for regional autonomy. In the words of a Malay informant: 
With autonomy, people’s feelings of regional identity got stronger. Some Malays 
started saying, ‘these ethnic groups are outsiders’, even though they’ve been here 
a long time and intermarried, and consider themselves Malay (interview with 
Malay informant, Pekanbaru, June 2002). 
Malay claims to exclusivity were also commented upon by a Riau-born Minang respondent: 
Feelings about ethnicity have gotten much stronger since regional autonomy. Each 
tribe wants to promote itself. Especially the Malays – they no longer want to 
accept that we’re orang Riau. But Riau’s not a tribe, it’s a place. We were born 
here, brought up here. We are orang Riau (interview with Riau-born Minang 
informant, Pekanbaru, June 2002). 
None of the islanders was concerned about excessive Malay power, but mainlanders 
frequently invoked stereotypes about Malay inferiority and were concerned about the 
opportunities for rent-seeking behaviour under regional autonomy. Less than a quarter of 
mainland informants were worried about Malay aspirations per se, but many more noted that, 
as putra daerah (‘sons of the region’, or local inhabitants), Malays had made significant 
attempts to gain preferential access to jobs and resources. While only seven islanders and just 
five mainland respondents emphasised a contribution to Riau as a criterion for claims to 
place, almost all mainland respondents mentioned the extent to which non-Malays had 
contributed to Riau’s development. Although most believed Malays should be given positions 
ahead of members of other ethnic groups if they met merit-based criteria, they criticised their 
ability and accused them of being lazy and proud: ‘When it comes to work, they choose jobs 
where you get a lot of money for not much effort’ (interview with Riau-born non-Malay, 
Pekanbaru, June 2002). A number also highlighted their concerns about increased corruption 
and the emergence of raja-raja kecil – a phrase that in Riau both literally means ‘little kings’ 
and is a play on the Malay title, raja. 
Although the adoption of Malay culture was a prerequisite for valid claims to place for only a 
few informants, many non-Malays in both Pekanbaru and Tanjungpinang emphasised how 
they had been influenced by local customs and values – in doing so, shifting away from their 
inherited cultural norms and weakening their links to their ancestral homelands. In the 
islands, the relatively successful assimilation of non-Malays was a source of security and a 
sense of belonging, but in Pekanbaru, perceptions of Malay exclusivity had caused 
considerable anxiety among those who felt they had no other place to go – most notably 
among Riau-born non-Malays, but also many long-term residents. 
If I go back to my parents’ village, the people there don’t accept me. They say I 
don’t know adat [tradition] – that I’m an outsider because I’m from Riau. That’s 
never mattered to me before, because I’ve never wanted to be from anywhere but 
here. But if we can no longer call ourselves orang Riau, where can we go? 
(interview with Riau-born non-Malay, Pekanbaru, June 2002). 
This fear of displacement is strongest among mainlanders of non-Malay interethnic 
background or in non-Malay interethnic marriages – that is, among those whose children are 
the furthest removed from ethnically defined claims to place in Riau or elsewhere. In the 
words of one Riau-born respondent, who was clearly distressed by threats to his own and his 
children’s sense of place: 
Our children have the blood of four ethnic groups – Sundanese, Javanese, 
Minangkabau and Acehnese. One was born in Pekanbaru and the other in Jakarta. 
If they won’t accept the one born in Jakarta, well, I can understand that, but what 
about the one born in Pekanbaru? Is she Malay, or Minang, or Javanese or 
Sundanese or Acehnese … or does she have no place? (interview with Riau-born 
non-Malay, Pekanbaru, June 2002). 
The most obvious silence among informants was on the subject of religion. Yet while only 
one respondent identified belonging to Islam as a criterion for being an orang Riau, those 
explicitly advocating the adoption of Malay culture were implicitly imposing Islam as a 
condition of belonging. The Batak people, who comprise the largest Christian community in 
Riau, are the group most clearly excluded on the grounds of religion. Yet only two of the 
seven respondents of Batak descent mentioned tension or discrimination against Bataks on 
religious grounds. 
One – a man who had lived in a primarily Muslim neighbourhood for almost two decades – 
gave concrete examples from everyday life, such as having to pay higher prices for kerosene 
because he was not a Muslim. He believed that he and his family had no choice but to accept 
such discrimination because the Bataks were identified as being Christian, and Christians 
were a minority group. Even so, both he and his wife felt that they belonged in Riau, and had 
no desire to return to North Sumatra. The other Batak who mentioned religion – himself a 
Muslim – pointed out that many of the violent incidents that had taken place in Riau had been 
directed against Bataks. He noted that a number of those incidents had been about practices 
that impinge on Muslim sensibilities, such as gambling and the drinking of alcohol, and about 
the building of a large number of churches – a development which he interpreted as a cynical 
Batak strategy for taking control of traditional Malay land. Nevertheless, all respondents felt 
that ethnic relations were better in Riau than in Indonesia as a whole. When questioned about 
the interethnic incidents that had occurred in recent years, they pointed to underlying 
economic disparities or personal disagreements, rather than ethnicity itself, as the root cause 
of conflict. Only three respondents, all from Pekanbaru, were worried about the possibility of 
serious ethnic conflict in the province. 
Conclusion 
How far can Indonesia be reshaped into a series of ethnically defined homelands? What are 
the consequences of such a process for its people? The case of Riau is instructive for 
Indonesia as a whole as it struggles to define itself in the era of regional autonomy. Overall, 
my informants’ responses suggested that while ethnic conflict could certainly increase in 
Riau, the likelihood of a major escalation has been overstated. 
This does not mean that ethnic relations should not be taken seriously. According to 
representatives of Minang, Batak and Malay ethnic organisations interviewed in June 2002, 
the provincial government and community leaders have already taken steps to deal with the 
symptoms of conflict by forming emergency response teams to deal with outbreaks of 
violence on a case-by-case basis. However, such outbreaks are likely to continue unless the 
economic and affective root causes of conflict are addressed. There is no argument for 
returning to the suppression of ethnic identity, but the path ahead will be a rocky one indeed 
if ethnicity becomes the overriding criterion for determining access to resources and claims to 
place. 
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